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Abstract
This paper is a cross-linguistic study of counterfactuality in simple clauses, as in the English construction
The police should have intervened. On the basis of a representative sample of languages, we investigate (i)
how counterfactuality is most commonly marked, and (ii) what these patterns of marking can tell us about
the nature and origins of counterfactuality.We first show that counterfactuality is most frequently marked by
a combination of elements that have other functions in other contexts, rather than by one single ‘dedicated’
marker. Contrary to popular belief, neither past tense nor imperfective aspect is a universal feature in the
combinations of markers used to signal counterfactuality: the only type of element that is found in every
combination is a modal element marking some type of potentiality, which can be combined (i) with past-
tense markers, (ii) with a combination of past tense and aspectual (perfect or perfective) markers, or (iii) just
with aspectual markers. On the basis of these findings about the marking of counterfactuality, we argue that
counterfactuality typically originates as a semanticization of pragmatic information, more specifically an
implicature derived from the compositional meaning of a combination of a modal element and a past, perfect
or perfective element.
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The phenomenon of counterfactuality is probably best known from the linguistic and logical
literature on conditional constructions like (1) below (see, amongst many others, Lakoff, 1970;
Lewis, 1973; Karttunen and Peters, 1977; Iatridou, 2000; Lazard, 2001; Dancygier and Sweetser,
2005). These conditional structures are counterfactual because they involve a reversal of the
polarity marked in the structure: part of the interpretation of the structure with positive polarity in
(1a) is that the police troops were not in fact sent in, and that as a consequence people were killed,
while part of the interpretation of its counterpart with negative polarity in (1b) is that troops were
sent in, and that they were able to prevent the killing.
(1) (a) If they had acted and sent in enough police troops, says the report, the bloody
episode could have been prevented.
(b) If they hadn’t acted and sent in enough police troops, says the report, the bloody
episode could not have been prevented.
In addition to the conditional structures illustrated in (1), many languages also have
counterfactual constructions in simple clauses, like the ones in (2) and (3) below, respectively from
English and Turkish. As with the conditional constructions, the interpretation of these structures
involves a reversal of polarity: the police in (2a) did not do anything to prevent the killing, thevictim
in (2b) was not killed, and the interlocutor in (3) did not read the book as they should have.
(2) (a) The police should have done something to prevent the killing. ENGLISH
(b) The poor man would have been killed.
(3) oku-ya-y-di-niz! TURKISH
read-OPT-COP-PST-2PL1
‘You should have read!’ (Kornfilt, 1997:372–1289)
One of the central questions in the analysis of these structures is where the feature of polarity
reversal comes from, i.e. how constructions with positive polarity like (1a), (2a), (2b) and (3) can
include the corresponding negative proposition in their interpretation, and how constructions
with negative polarity like (1b) can include the corresponding positive proposition. In the
literature on conditional constructions, the answer to this question has focused mainly on
pragmatic properties of the conditional protasis, and its relation to the apodosis: the speaker
presupposes (Lakoff, 1970) or implicates (Karttunen and Peters, 1977) falsity of the protasis, and
thus triggers a counterfactual interpretation for the entire structure. Whatever the value of this
type of explanation for conditional constructions like (1), it cannot be a general explanation for
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1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses: ABS – absolutive; ACC – accusative; AFF – affirmative;
ANR – action nominalizer; ANT – anterior; AO – aorist; ART – article; ASSERT – assertedly; AP – absolutive pluralizer;
AUX – auxiliary; CJ – conjunction; CL – classifier; COMP – complementizer; COND – conditional; COP – copula;
CTF – counterfactual; DAT – dative; DC – declarative; DEB – debitive; DEF – definite; DST – destinative; DX – deixis;
ERG – ergative; FUT – future; HAB – habitual; ID – identification clitic; IMPF – imperfective; IND – indicative;
INF – infinitive; INTR – intransitive; IOV – indirect object version; IRR – irrealis; LOC – locative; M –masculine; MED –
medial; NEG – negative; NOM – nominative; NOML – nominalizer; OBL – oblique; OPT – optative; PERF – perfect;
PERFV – perfective; PFP – perfect participle; PLUP – pluperfect; POT – potential; PREV – preverb; PRIV – privative;
PRSP – prospective; PRT – particle; PST – past; PTV – partitive; PURP – purposive; QT – quotative; REL – relative;
SS – same subject; SUBJ – subjunctive; TC – topic-contrast marker; TEMP – temporal; TS – thematic suffix;
VR – verbalizer; VTV – ventive.
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polarity reversal in counterfactual contexts, because not all counterfactual constructions are
conditional. In addition to the ‘canonical’ conditional type in (1), there are also simple-clause
counterfactuals like (2) and (3) above. Some of these have a fairly straightforward relation with
conditional counterparts (see also Lazard, 2001), like the structure in (2b) above, which could be
regarded as a conditional construction with an elided protasis (e.g. The poor man would have been
killed if the police hadn’t intervened). Others, however, like (2a) and (3), cannot so easily be
analysed as a conditional apodosis with an elided protasis, but still have counterfactual
interpretations. In this study, we will focus on the second category, and we will try to develop an
alternative interpretation of counterfactuality that does not rely exclusively on conditional
constructions. We will come back to conditional counterfactuals in the concluding section of the
study, where we will discuss how the model developed for simple counterfactuals could also have
some relevance for conditional counterfactuals.
One alternative theory of polarity reversal that goes beyond conditional contexts is proposed
in James (1982) and Fleischman (1989), who focus on the morphosyntactic marking of
counterfactuality to explain the feature of polarity reversal. Building on an older tradition going
back to Joos (1964) and Steele (1975), they claim that counterfactual constructions typically
involve some kind of past-tense marking, like the pluperfect in the English structures in (1) and
the past tense in the Turkish structure in (3). James (1982) and Fleischman (1989) argue that the
use of past tense in these structures is motivated by the fact that it forms a natural metaphorical
model for the marking of non-reality: both past and non-reality involve distance from the here-
and-now, in one case distance in the domain of time, in the other distance in the domain of reality.
Accordingly, they argue, past-tense markers will not only have their basic function of marking
past temporal reference, but will typically also have some extensions to constructions that
involve non-reality, like the counterfactual ones illustrated above. In this perspective, the polarity
reversal in counterfactual constructions could be accounted for as a metaphorical extension from
the basic past-tense meaning of remoteness in time to remoteness in reality.
Like the explanation that focuses on conditionals, however, this explanation is not entirely
satisfactory. As pointed out by Dahl (1997), the basic problem with the past-tense theory is that
past tense hardly ever marks counterfactuality on its own. Except for some uses of the imparfait
in French (see Fleischman, 1989; Lazard, 2001:417), there are no clear cases where past tense is
the only marker of counterfactuality. Instead, it is usually a combination of a past tense with some
other type of marker that signals counterfactuality, like the conditional conjunction if in (1), the
modal verbs should or would in (2a) and (2b) or the optative mood in (3). Indeed, if
counterfactuality were marked by past tense alone, there would be no way to distinguish between
real and non-real utterances about past situations.
How, then, can the feature of polarity reversal associated with counterfactual constructions be
explained? In this study, we will try to answer this question with a cross-linguistic study of the
marking of counterfactuality in simple clauses like (2a) and (3) above. On the basis of data from a
sample of 43 languages (see below for details on the composition of the sample), we will try to
answer the following questions:
(i) How is counterfactuality marked in simple clauses like (2a) and (3)?
(a) With single markers or with combinations of markers?
(b) In the case of combinations, which functions do these markers have in other
contexts?
(ii) What do these patterns of marking tell us about the nature and the origins of
counterfactuality?
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As to the first question, we will show that in the large majority of languages, counterfactuality
is encoded by a combination of markers rather than one single ‘dedicated’ marker, and that these
combinations usually consist of a modal element marking some type of potentiality (epistemic,
deontic or dynamic), together with a tense marker (past) and/or an aspectual marker (perfect or
perfective). As to the second question, we will argue that the frequent use of a combination of
elements with other functions in other contexts points to the hypothesis that counterfactuality
typically originates as a pragmatic implicature of the basic compositional interpretation of these
combinations, which can subsequently be semanticized as part of their basic meaning. In the case
of past-modal combinations, for instance, we will show that counterfactuality can be
reconstructed as a Gricean quantity implicature derived from their compositional meaning of past
potentiality. In addition, wewill argue that our analysis also implies that counterfactual structures
are semantically more complex than commonly assumed, because they are double-layered,
combining a feature of polarity reversal with the compositional interpretation in which this
feature originates.
The sample of languages on which this study is based, was composed using the method of
diversity sampling developed by Rijkhoff et al. (1993), and further elaborated in Rijkhoff and
Bakker (1998). The basic idea is that linguistic diversity is best represented in a sample of
languages if (i) every top-level genetic grouping is represented by at least one language, with
isolates representing one group each and pidgins and creoles one group jointly, and (ii) further
representatives of these top-level groupings are chosen proportionally on the basis of the
internal diversity of the groups (see Rijkhoff and Bakker, 1998 for more details on the
definition of diversity—the basic idea is that more diverse groups will have more
representatives). For this study, implementation of these principles led to an initial sample of
52 languages,2 as also used in Rijkhoff (2002), which was subsequently reduced to 43 because
of the absence of information on counterfactuality marking for a number of language isolates
and extinct languages. Appendix A at the end of this study gives an overview of the
43 languages that were investigated, and the nine languages that were excluded because of
lack of information.
The rest of this study will be structured as follows. In section 2, we will present an overview of
our basic findings about the marking of counterfactuality in simple clauses in our sample. In
section 3, we will try to interpret these findings, focusing mainly on the different types of
combinations of markers, and the question how the feature of polarity reversal has become
associated with this combination of markers. In section 4, finally, we will draw some more
general conclusions about the nature of counterfactuality, and discuss how our findings about
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2 Like Rijkhoff (2002), we use Ruhlen (1991) to identify the top-level genetic groupings to compose the sample.
We are aware of the controversies surrounding some of the ‘lumping’ tendencies in his high-level groupings, like
Austric (grouping together Austronesian with Austro-Asiatic and Daic), Indo-Pacific (grouping all non-Austronesian
languages of Melanesia), Australian (grouping Pama-Nyungan and non-Pama-Nyungan languages) and especially
Amerind (grouping together most of the languages of North and South America, apart from Na-Dene). For the
purpose of putting together a diversity sample, however, these ‘lumping’ tendencies do not threaten the diversity of
the sample as such: the more groups are lumped together in higher-level groups, the more internally diverse these
higher groups will be, which means that in a diversity sample these higher-level groups will also have proportionally
more representatives, usually at least one for each less controversial subgroup. Concretely, for instance, in a
52-language sample like the one used here, the controversial ‘Austric’ group is represented by members from all its
better established subgroups, i.e. one Austro-Asiatic language, one Daic language and two Austronesian languages.
The same applies to ‘Amerind’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’.
Author's personal copy
counterfactuality in simple clauses might be extended to other counterfactual contexts,
specifically in conditional constructions.
2. The basic patterns of counterfactuality marking
Of the 43 languages for which we have information about counterfactual constructions,
there are 32 grammars that provide information on simple counterfactual constructions like
(2a) and (3) above, and 39 that provide information on conditional counterfactual
constructions like (1) and (2b) above. Appendix A shows which information is available
for which languages. In this study, we will focus on the simple counterfactual constructions,
and outline the patterns of marking found in the sample languages. In general, identifying
counterfactual constructions in the grammars, and distinguishing simple-clause counter-
factuals like (2a) and (3) from full and reduced conditionals like (1) and (2b) is quite
straightforward. The first question is a matter of detecting polarity reversal: as soon as a
particular structure has a standard interpretation that involves the reverse of the polarity that is
formally marked in the structure, we have a case of counterfactuality. The second question,
distinguishing between genuine simple-clause counterfactuals and conditional apodoses
without a protasis, can either be resolved on the basis of the semantics of the construction,
which often does not allow reconstruction of an elided protasis, or on the basis of its structure,
which is often structurally distinct from the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional. In case
of doubt about the status of a particular structure discussed in this study (typically because of
an unclear translation that suggests conditional status), we will explicitly discuss the evidence
for the simple-clause status of the structure. The relation between our simple counterfactuals
and the much better-studied category of conditional counterfactuals will be discussed in the
concluding section of the study.
In general, the languages in the sample show a clear tendency towards using combinations of
markers to mark counterfactuality in simple clauses: 7 languages use one single marker for
counterfactuality, whereas 25 languages use a combination of two or more markers that have
other functions in other contexts. The first type will be discussed in section 2.1, and the second
one will be discussed in sections 2.2–2.4. Section 2.2 will be devoted to the dominant pattern in
combined marking, viz. the use of a combination of modal elements with past-tense markers.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 will be devoted to two less frequent patterns of combined marking, viz. the
combination of a modal marker with an aspectual (perfect or perfective) marker with (section
2.3) and without (section 2.4) past tense.
2.1. Direct counterfactual marking
The use of one single ‘dedicated’ marker for counterfactuality is clearly a minority
case in the sample: only 7 languages of out 32 mark counterfactuality directly rather than
with a combination of markers that have other functions in other contexts. This is the
case in Chukchi, Hua, Ika, Kolyma Yukaghir, Martuthunira, Mwotlap and Somali. In Hua,
for instance, there is an ‘irrealis’ verbal suffix –hine that is used in counterfactual contexts
like (4) (Haiman, 1980:160–161). This suffix cannot be analysed further as a combination
of other elements, except for the fact that it has different forms depending on the
illocutionary frame and the subject involved, like the form –hine in (4), which can be used for
assertions with any subject except dual, first person plural or second person singular
(Haiman, 1980:xl).
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(4) kori hu hine HUA
fear do.1 CTF.A
‘I would have run away/I almost ran away’3 (Haiman, 1980:160)
Likewise, Martuthunira (Pama-Nyungan) has two verbal suffixes labelled ‘‘counterfactual’’
and ‘‘unrealized’’ mood which are used in counterfactual constructions, as illustrated in (5)
(Dench, 1995:150–152). Again, the author does not further analyse these suffixes, except for a
voice contrast between an active and a passive form for the counterfactual type.




‘‘I truly forgot. [I] ought to have thought of that one that always sits on a branch,
[but I didn’t].’’ (Dench, 1995:152)
A similar phenomenon is found in Kolyma Yukaghir (Maslova, 2003:171–172), where
counterfactuality is marked by the irrealis pre-verb et+, as in (6).
(6) tudel pud-o-l lebie-ge modo-t KOLYMA YUKAGHIR
he upper-VR-ANR earth-LOC sit-SS:IMPF
m-et+l’e-j
AFF-IRR+be-INTR:3SG
‘‘He should have lived on the upper earth.’’ (Maslova, 2003:172)
2.2. Combinations of modality with past tense
For languages that use combinations of markers to signal counterfactuality, one of the
elements in the combination is invariably a modal marker, while the other element is a past
marker (16 languages), a combination of a past marker and an aspectual marker (six languages),
or just an aspectual marker (five languages). This clearly goes against James’ (1982) and
Fleischman’s (1989) generalization that past tense is a universal feature in counterfactuality
marking: if anything is a general feature in this domain, it is modality rather than past tense. The
nature of these modal elements will be discussed in more detail in section 3, where we will argue
that it is the modal element, and specifically the feature of potentiality it marks, rather than just
the past tense element that is needed to explain the polarity reversal in counterfactual
constructions. As a working definition, we will use the term ‘modality’ as referring to any
element that signals some type of potentiality of an event, either in terms of speaker’s judgements
of plausibility (epistemic potentiality), speaker’s judgements of desirability (deontic
potentiality), or agent’s intentions (dynamic potentiality).
In this section, we will discuss the combinations of modality with past markers: Cantonese,
Icari Dargwa, Fongbe, Gooniyandi, Hdi, Imbabura Quechua, Kham, Korean, Ma’di, Matses,
Ndyuka, Slave, Temiar, Turkish, Wardaman and Yimas all use a combination of modality with
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3 This structure could in principle be an apodosis with an elided protasis (Haiman, 1980:185–187), but it can also be
interpreted as a genuine simple clause without any conditional interpretation, as reflected in the gloss with ‘almost’ (see
further Haiman, 1980:160–161).
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one or more past tense markers. In Cantonese, for instance, a combination of modal verbs of
possibility or obligation with adverbs referring to a past time yields a counterfactual
interpretation, as in (7) (Matthews and Yip, 1994:231,235).
(7) le´ih bu´nlo`ih ho´yı´h sanchı´ng ni fahn gung ge CANTONESE
you originally can apply this CL job PRT
‘‘You could have applied for this job.’’ (Matthews and Yip, 1994:231)
The same applies to Wardaman, where a combination of a modal irrealis prefix (used
elsewhere to indicate undesirable possibilities and prohibitions) with a past tense suffix to the
verb signals counterfactuality, as in (8) (Merlan, 1994:188).
(8) yi-nga-jejbarla-rri wu-munburra-wu WARDAMAN
IRR-1SG/3SG-ask-PST WU-money-DAT
‘‘I should have asked him for money.’’ (Merlan, 1994:188)
In some languages, the labels used for the elements involved in counterfactuality marking at
first sight do not clearly point towards modal or temporal status, but their actual functions as
described in the grammars usually do. In Imbabura Quechua, for instance, counterfactuality is
signalled by a combination of a past tense auxiliary with a conditional suffix on the main verb. In
spite of the label used, the ‘conditional’ suffix in this language is not exclusively associated with
complex conditional constructions, as a marker of the apodosis both in standard and
counterfactual conditionals (Cole, 1982:64-65; 157), but it can also be used in simple clauses
with epistemic meanings: on its own, the conditional suffix can signal epistemic possibility as in
(9) (Cole, 1982:154–155). In combination with an auxiliary marked for past tense, on the other
hand, the same suffix signals counterfactuality, as in (10), but it does not appear in conditional
constructions (Cole, 1982:65, 157), in spite of what the gloss provided by the author seems to
suggest.
(9) shamu-y-man IMBABURA QUECHUA
come-1Sg-COND
‘‘I would come.’’ (Cole, 1982:154)
shamu-y-man ka-rka-ni IMBABURA QUECHUA
come-1Sg-COND be-PST-1Sg
‘‘I would have come.’’ (Cole, 1982:155)
A similar terminological problem is found in Gooniyandi, where counterfactuality is marked
by a subjunctive or potential suffix in combination with an irrealis suffix to the verb, as illustrated
in (11) (McGregor, 1990:548–550, 533–537).
(11) ward-wi+jadd+i-rni GOONIYANDI
go-IRR+(1U)NOM+i-POT
‘‘We could have gone.’’ (McGregor, 1990:221)
In spite of the use of the label ‘irrealis’, the category in question is not exclusively modal but
belongs to a system that ‘‘conflates modal type meanings with purely temporal meanings’’
(McGregor, 1990:524). As the irrealis cannot be used on its own, its function cannot be checked
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directly, but it is found in the same morphological lot in the structure of the verb where other
tense distinctions are marked in the language (McGregor, 1990:516), and it is only found in
utterances that refer to past propositions (compare McGregor’s (1990:525) use of a feature [+
anterior]). If we add to this that the categories with which irrealis is combined to encode
counterfactuality (subjunctive and potential) can also occur in combination with other elements
than irrealis to encode various types of non-past modality, like epistemic possibility in the
combination of potential with future in (12), we can safely assign a past tense feature to the
irrealis suffix in (11) above. Verstraete (2005) provides further arguments for the analysis of this
element as containing a past tense feature, in the context of a broader study of mood marking in
non-Pama-Nyungan languages.
(12) ward-bi+ng+i-rni yaningi-yoo GOONIYANDI
go-FUT+1Sg+I-POT now-DAT
‘‘I could go soon.’’ (McGregor, 1990:537)
2.3. Combinations of modality with past tense and aspectual marking
In addition to the combination of past and modality, some languages also require another
element to mark counterfactuality, viz. an aspectual element like perfect or perfective (see below
in section 3.3 for the relevance of the distinction between the two). This is the case in Basque,
Dutch, Georgian, Malayalam, Nootka and Supyire. In Basque, for instance, counterfactuality in
simple clauses is signalled by a combination of past and potential suffixes on the auxiliary and the
perfective participle of the main verb, as in (13) (Saltarelli, 1988:235–236). In this language, the
potential suffix is a modal element because it is used to mark permission and ability in other
contexts.




baina ez n-u-en etxe-tik
but not 1SG.ERG-(PST-ABS)-AUX2-PST house-SG.ABL
atera-tze-ko gogo-rik
leave-NOML-DST urge-PTV
‘‘I could have taken the books to her/him, but I did not feel like leaving the
house.’’ (Saltarelli, 1988:235)
A similar pattern is found in Malayalam, where counterfactuality is encoded with a
combination of past, debitive and perfect suffixes to the verb stem, as illustrated in (14) (Asher
and Kumari, 1997:306–307).
(14) naan pook-eent-ata-ay-irunnu MALAYALAM
I go-DEB-NOML-[linking -ay-] [PERF.]PST
(pakse poo-y-i-[i]lla) (our glosses)
but go-[linking -y-]-PST-NEG
‘‘I should have gone (but didn’t go).’’ (Asher and Kumari, 1997:307)
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To this category we can also add languages like Georgian, where counterfactuality is marked
with a combination of a modal auxiliary expressing obligation and a pluperfect suffix on the main
verb, as in (15) (Hewitt, 1995:267–268). A combination of a past and a perfect element, as in
Basque in (13), generally yields a pluperfect category, i.e. a perfect relative to a past, but what
distinguishes Georgian from the previous category is that the pluperfect is expressed
synthetically in one single morpheme in the structure of the verb.
(15) dro-ze unda ga-g-e-k’et-eb-in-a GEORGIAN
time-on should PREV-you-IOV-do-TS-PLUP-it
‘‘You should have done it on time.’’ (Hewitt, 1995:267)
2.4. Combinations of modality with aspectual marking
A final set of five languages leave out past tense altogether in the marking of counterfactuality,
and mark the category with a combination of modality and aspectual elements, specifically
perfect or perfective: this is the case in Kashmiri, Nakanai, Nootka, Pipil and Slave. Kashmiri, for
instance, uses a combination of conditional mood marking on the auxiliary with a perfect
participle of the main verb, as in (16) (Wali and Koul, 1997:237–238). Again, it should be noted
that the conditional marker in this language is not exclusively associated with conditional
constructions, but can also be used in independent clauses with a modal meaning of epistemic
likelihood (see Wali and Koul, 1997:237).
(16) tse a:si-he:th por-mut akhba:r KASHMIRI
you.ERG be-COND.3M.SG.2SG read-PFP.3M.SG newspaper.3M.SG
‘‘You would have read the newspaper.’’ (Wali and Koul, 1997:238)
A similar situation is found in Slave, which uses a combination of a future particle with
perfective marking on the verb, as in (17) below (Rice, 1989:414–419). It is important to note in
this case that the future particle does not just denote futurity, but also has the dynamic modal
meanings of signalling the agent’s intentions (Rice, 1989:418–419).
(17) du´ na´hkale egha´laiida´ wole´ni SLAVE
now morning 1SG.worked4 FUT
‘‘I should have worked this morning’’ (Rice, 1989:419)
2.5. Conclusion
To conclude our survey of counterfactuality in simple clauses,we can say that there are a number
of clear patterns that emerge from the patterns of marking found in the sample. First of all, direct
marking of counterfactuality is rare: only 7 languages out of 32 use one single marker in
counterfactual constructions, while 25 languages use a combination of markers that have other
functions in other contexts. Second, ifwe look at combinations ofmarkers it is not the featureof past
tense that is most typical, as predicted in James (1982) and Fleischman (1989), but the feature
of modality. Every single combination of markers contains at least some type of modal marker.
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Third, if we look at the types ofmarkers that are used in combination withmodalmarkers, themost
frequent type is past tensemarking, either just past tense (16 languages) or past tense combinedwith
perfect or perfective aspect (6 languages), or just perfect or perfective aspect (5 languages). Table 1
summarizes the patterns found in the sample. Shading of cells indicates which types of markers are
used in the counterfactual construction in each language. The use of more than one line for a
particular language indicates that there are two distinct counterfactual constructions in that
language.
3. Explaining the patterns: the origins of counterfactuality
The most remarkable characteristic of counterfactuality to emerge from the sample is that it is
relatively rarely encoded by a single ‘dedicated’ marker, and is instead most commonly
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Table 1
The marking of counterfactuality in the sample
Language Direct Combination



































associated with a combination of markers that have other functions in other contexts,
like the frequently found combination of elements that otherwise have modal and temporal
functions. What do these patterns of marking tell us about the nature and origins
of counterfactuality? If we add up the meanings contributed by each of the elements
in the combinations, this does not lead to an interpretation that includes the feature of
polarity reversal: the combination of modality and past tense, for instance, just yields
past modality (i.e. ‘something was possible, desirable, intended’), but not necessarily
the feature of non-occurrence (‘but it did not happen’). In more general terms, therefore,
the combined meanings of the markers does not correspond to their actual interpretation.
From a theoretical perspective, one interpretation of this discrepancy could be that we are
dealing with constructions in the sense of Goldberg (1995), the defining feature of which is
that a combination of elements has a meaning that goes beyond the combination of their
individual meanings. From a semantic perspective, however, the fact that this discrepancy is
found in the majority of languages in our sample, suggests that there is something more to it
than just an idiom-like mismatch between compositional and construction-level interpreta-
tion. The very systematicity of this mismatch across languages suggests that there must be
some motivated relation between the two levels of interpretation, which more or less
systematically leads from the compositional interpretation to the eventual counterfactual
interpretation.
In this section, we will argue that the relation can be motivated in pragmatic terms: the
discrepancy between the compositional semantics of the combinations and their actual
counterfactual interpretation points towards an origin of counterfactuality as an implicature. We
will show that a combination of an element that has a modal function with an element that has a
past-tense or perfect(-ive)-aspect function is ideally suited to trigger a generalized implicature of
polarity reversal, based on the Gricean maxim of quantity (see also Ziegeler, 2000:32–34), a
scenario that is supported by the fact that such combinations are found with counterfactual
interpretations across the genetically diverse set of languages investigated here. Sections 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 will outline the general theoretical arguments, focusing on the role of modality, tense and
aspect respectively. Section 3.4 will adduce further evidence from the sample in favour of this
analysis. Section 3.5, finally, will discuss the pattern of marking in the sample that is not captured
by this generalization, i.e. those languages that mark counterfactuality directly with one single
‘dedicated’ marker.
3.1. The role of modality
At the most schematic level, the modal expressions found in the patterns of counterfactual
marking in the sample can be defined in terms of a semantic feature of potentiality (see further
Verstraete, 2001 on the definition of the modal notions used here). What all these expressions
have in common is that they mark the occurrence of an event as potential rather than actual, either
because the speaker regards it as plausible (epistemic potentiality), because the speaker regards it
as desirable (deontic potentiality), or because a clausal participant intends to realize it (dynamic
potentiality). The first category can be illustrated with the modal verb ho´yih in Cantonese, which
on its own marks epistemic possibility, as in (18), and in combination with a past-tense adverb
marks counterfactuality (see example (7) above). The second category can be illustrated with the
debitive mood in Malayalam: on its own, this serves to mark deontic modality, as in (19), and in
combination with past perfective it marks counterfactuality (see example (14) above). The third
category can be illustrated with the modal verb willen (‘want to’) in Dutch, which marks agent’s
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intention as in (20), and in combination with a pluperfect tense5 serves to mark counterfactuality,
as in (21).
(18) le´ih ho´yı´h daap ba¯si heui Ma`hnfa Ju¯ngsa¯m CANTONESE
you can catch bus go Cultural Centre
‘‘You can take a bus (to get) to the Cultural Centre.’’ (Matthews and Yip, 1994:231)
(19) avan nallava am pa hikk-a am MALAYALAM
he well study-DEB
‘‘He must study well.’’ (Asher and Kumari, 1997:306)
(20) Ik wil naar de vergadering komen DUTCH
1Sg want to the meeting come-INF
‘‘I want to come to the meeting.’’
(21) Ik had naar de vergadering willen komen, maar . . . DUTCH
1Sg AUX-PST to the meeting want-INF come-INF, but . . .
‘‘I had wanted to come to the meeting, but . . .’’
As already mentioned, the cross-linguistically frequent use of such modal categories in the
marking of counterfactuality suggests that there may be some systematic relation to the feature of
polarity reversal. Following a suggestion in the work of Ziegeler (2000:32–34) on the diachrony
of English conditional constructions, we will argue that the link with polarity reversal lies in
(i) the scalar relation between modal expressions and their corresponding non-modal structures,
and (ii) the quantity implicatures that can be derived from this scalar relation.
In general, a scalar organization of expressions uses the relative informational strength of
these expressions to order them, with strength being measured in terms of such traditional criteria
as entailment relations (stronger expressions entail weaker ones), cancelling and suspending
expressions (Horn, 1989:234; weaker and stronger expressions can be ordered with expressions
like even or if not, as in warm, even hot), or less traditional ones like partially ordered sets
(Hirschberg, 1991; to deal with discursively defined scales). The classic example of such scalar
organization comes from the domain of quantifiers (Horn, 1989), illustrated in (22a), where the
quantifiers some and all form the weaker and stronger points of a scale: all entails some, and the
two can be ordered as some, {if not/even} all.
(22) (a) some < all
(b) some :all
One of the reasons for organizing expressions in terms of scales is that it allows one to make
generalizations about implicature mechanisms within the set of expressions being studied. If the
expressions are ordered in terms of informational strength, this implies that a mechanism of
quantity implicature can be invoked to calculate relations between them on the basis of the first
Gricean maxim of quantity: ‘‘make your contribution as informative as is required’’ (Grice,
1975:45). In the classic example of quantifier scales, for instance, use of a weaker element from
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the scale, like some, will be interpreted as meaning that the informationally stronger element all
was not applicable in the context, i.e. it will implicate ‘not all’ (as in (22b)).
This type of scalar mechanism is relevant for the problem of counterfactuality because (i)
modal expressions can equally be analysed in terms of scalar organization, and (ii) the associated
implicature mechanisms can be used to explain the link with polarity reversal. Traditionally, the
study of modal scales has focused on relations between different degrees of modality, especially
necessity and possibility (see Horn, 1989; Van der Auwera, 1996; Levinson, 2000). There is
another aspect of modal scales that is particularly relevant for counterfactual expressions,
however: the relation between modal structures and their corresponding non-modal counterparts,
i.e. the corresponding ‘bare’ assertions. As shown in Ziegeler’s analysis of the diachrony of
conditional constructions in English (Ziegeler, 2000:32–34), modal structures like would (have)
q can be regarded as the middle point of a scale with the corresponding non-modal structure q as
its strongest point, and the corresponding conditional structure if p, would (have) q as its weakest
point. This scale is represented in (23a) below. If this scale is correct, the non-applicability of the
bare assertion of q follows by application of the Gricean maxim of quantity (23b), as in the case
of the quantifiers.
(23) (a) if p, would (have) q < would (have) q < q
(b) would (have) q :q
As already mentioned, one of the traditional criteria used to determine whether a set of
elements really forms a scale in the technical sense is the presence of an entailment relation
between the items, e.g. all entailing some. We think that there are good arguments to posit a
similar scale between modal utterances and their non-modal counterparts, but unlike Ziegeler
(2000:33), who analyzes modalization as quantification over propositions, we would not draw a
strong analogy between the quantifier case and the modal case. Instead, we argue that the basis of
the scale between modal utterances and their non-modal counterparts is a matter of epistemic
strength rather than quantification. Specifically, the contrast between the modal structures found
in the sample6 and their non-modal counterparts can be described in terms of potentiality versus
certainty: a non-modal proposition like John is coming is a statement of certainty, while
modalized alternatives like the epistemic John may be coming or the deontic John must come are
statements of potentiality, and therefore essentially statements of uncertainty. Unlike the
certainty involved in non-modal propositions, which is always epistemic, the potentiality
involved in modal propositions is of course not necessarily epistemic, but can also be deontic
(as in (20) above) or dynamic (as in (21) above). At first sight, the existence of non-epistemic
types of potentiality in the sample may seem to imply that such structures cannot form a scale
with the corresponding bare propositions, which are epistemic. Still, even non-epistemic types of
potentiality have epistemic implications: if an event is desirable for one of the speech act
participants (deontic), or if a clause participant has the intention to realize an event (dynamic),
realization of this event also becomes more likely in an epistemic sense. The reality of these links
between non-epistemic and epistemic modality is amply supported by diachronic and typological
work on modality (see, for instance, Bybee et al., 1994; Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998),
which has shown (i) that there are typical paths of development for modal expressions leading
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from deontic and dynamic interpretations to epistemic ones, and (ii) that the driving forces
behind such developments are precisely the type of epistemic implications of non-epistemic
modals described here (Traugott and Dasher, 2001).
In this perspective, we can say that modal utterances and their non-modal counterparts
generally form scales of epistemic strength, as represented in (24a), with the non-modal
utterances as the stronger expression of certainty, and the modal utterances as the weaker
expressions of potentiality, and therefore also uncertainty.7 The same applies to the
corresponding negative structures, as shown in (24c): because we are dealing with internal
negation here, negation does not reverse the scale but preserves it (see Horn, 1989:236–237 on
scale reversal with external negation).
(24) (a) potential p <p
(b) potential p :p
(c) potential :p < :p
(d) potential :p :(:p)
p
If the scales in (24a) and (24c) are correct, they can explain the link between modality and
polarity reversal observed in our sample, by simple application of the Gricean maxim of quantity.
Given that a modalized version of p is weaker than an unmodalized version, using the modalized
version implicates the negation of its unmodalized counterpart, as shown in (24b) and (24d).
Thus, the scalar quantity implicature can generate the feature of polarity reversal that is needed to
explain the counterfactual interpretation of modalized structures: using modalized p implicates
the negation of p, and therefore leads to the counterfactual interpretation of a potential event that
is not actualized.
3.2. The role of tense
If we go back to our data with this hypothesis, it is obvious that this cannot be the full story
about polarity reversal. The analysis of the sample has shown that counterfactuality is not
associated with modality as such, but most typically with combinations of modality and past
tense. This suggests that scalar organization and the associated implicature mechanism are
sensitive to features of tense.
As an example of this temporal sensitivity, we can compare future-oriented and past-oriented
versions of the same modal proposition, like the English structures in (25a) and (25b) and the
Gooniyandi structures in (26a) and (26b).
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(25) (a) Jack should come to the party. ENGLISH
Interpretation 6¼ :p (‘Jack is not coming to the party’)
(b) Jack should have come to the party.
Interpretation = :p (‘Jack did not come to the party’)
(26) (a) Jack-ngga mila-ya-wingga GOONIYANDI
Jack-ERG see-SUBJ-FUT+(2Sg)A+A
‘Jack wants to see you.’ (McGregor, 1990:547)
Interpretation 6¼ :p (‘Jack will not see you’)
(b) dirib-ja-yoondi yoowayi nirdganoo-woo
enter-SUBJ-IRR+CL he:was:afraid he:sticks-DEF
‘He wanted to go inside but was afraid of getting stuck.’ (McGregor, 1990:549)
Interpretation = :p (‘He did not go inside’)
Both the (a)- and the (b)-structures are modal propositions: should has a deontic interpretation
in (25), and the subjunctive mood has a dynamic interpretation in (26). Still, it is only in the
(b)-structures, i.e. the combinations with past tense, that the negation of the non-modal
counterpart is included in the interpretation. The structure with should with present infinitive in
(25a) is not typically interpreted as meaning that Jack is not coming, and the structure with
subjunctive future in (26a) is not typically interpreted as meaning that Jack will not see the
interlocutor, whereas the corresponding structures with past tense in (25b) and (26b) are
(remember that the category labelled ‘irrealis’ in Gooniyandi has past-tense features, along with
modal features, see McGregor’s (1990) analysis quoted in section 2.2). This divergence suggests
that features of tense play a crucial role in scalar organization and the associated quantity
implicatures: modal structures include the negative of their non-modal counterpart when they are
in past tense (b-structures), but not when they are in a present or a future tense (a-structures).
The reason behind this divergence, we argue, is that different temporal domains have different
epistemic implications: the past domain is inherently knowable, whereas the other domains are
not inherently knowable.8 If we look at the relation between modal and non-modal utterances
from this perspective, this implies that it is only in the past that a non-modal utterance is
necessarily a statement of certainty. For structures like (25a) and (26a), the corresponding
non-modal structure is not a statement of certainty, because it involves a projected event and
therefore is inherently unknowable,while for past structures like (25b) and (26b), the corresponding
non-modal structure is a statement of certainty.
The crucial point about the scalar organization discussed in the previous section is precisely
that a non-modal structure should be a statement of certainty in order to form a scale of epistemic
strength with the corresponding modal structure that marks potentiality. This is the case in the
past-tense domain, which explains why the mechanism of scalar implicatures works with past
modal combinations like (25b) and (26b), but not with future modal combinations like (25a) and
(26a). In the past, a non-modal structure is a statement of certainty, and is therefore epistemically
stronger that the corresponding modal statement of potentiality, as shown in (27a). By the
Gricean maxim of quantity, use of such a past potential statement implicates that the
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epistemically stronger non-modal statement did not apply in the situation in question, as shown in
(27b). Again, the same applies to internally negated structures, as shown in (27c) and (27d). In the
other tenses, the corresponding non-modal statement is not necessarily a statement of certainty,
which means that the modal and non-modal structures do not form a scale, and that use of the
modal structure does not implicate that the modal structure does not apply.
(27) (a) potential (past p) < past p
(b) potential (past p) :(past p)
(c) potential (past :p) < past :p
(d) potential (past :p) past p
It is important to note at this point that the certainty associated with the past domain is
independent of the temporal location of the actual event described in the statement.9 As pointed
out by a reviewer, structures like (28) seem to present a challenge to our argument, since the
adverbial tomorrow clearly indicates that the event referred to in (28) is located in the future,
while the interpretation still includes polarity reversal.
(28) John should have left tomorrow.
What is special about this structure, however, is that it invokes a pre-existing arrangement
rather than a simple prediction about the future: in other words, the corresponding non-modal
structure is not the standard predictive structure You will leave tomorrow, but rather a structure
encoding pre-arranged futures like You were leaving tomorrow. The link with the pre-arranged
structure is demonstrated by the fact that (28) can be used in any situation indicating that the
arrangement is broken, not just when the interlocutor has already left, but also, for instance, when
the interlocutor is still around but has made alternative arrangements, e.g. has bought a ticket for
another day. This shows that what really matters for the mechanism of scalar implicatures is not
the time of the event described, but the time of certainty about the event: tensewith scope over the
event does not influence counterfactuality, while tense with scope over the modal does. In this
sense, instances like (28) are a limiting case to show the working of the scalar mechanism and its
interaction with tense. What matters for a modal structure to trigger counterfactual implicatures
is that its non-modal counterpart is a statement of certainty, and this is independent of the time of
the event described.
In this sense, structures like (28) illustrate a general point, which can be demonstrated a
fortiori with structures like (29) and (30), both of which vary the time of the event described
without influencing the counterfactual nature of the structure. Counterfactuality is only
influenced by the temporal domain of the modal: the past modal judgement of desirability in (30)
receives a counterfactual interpretation, irrespective of the temporal location of the event, while
the present modal judgement of likelihood in (29) does not receive a counterfactual
interpretation, again irrespective of the temporal location of the event.
(29) (a) Possibly John left.
(b) Possibly John is leaving now.
(c) Possibly John will leave.
A. Van linden, J.-C. Verstraete / Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008) 1865–18951880
9 We are grateful to a reviewer for confronting us with examples like (28)–(30), which forced us to re-think our analysis
of tense, and to distinguish more clearly between the tense of the modal and the tense of the event.
Author's personal copy
(30) (a) You should have left yesterday.
(b) You should have left right now.
(c) You should have left tomorrow.
To summarize the argument so far, we have shown that the cross-linguistically frequent
association of counterfactual interpretation (i.e. polarity reversal) with combinations of past and
modal elements marking potentiality can be reconstructed on the basis of scalar quantity
implicatures. Marking a structure with a modal element invokes a link with the corresponding
non-modal structure, and locating the modal in the past domain ensures that this link is scalar, in
the sense that a past non-modal structure as a statement of certainty is epistemically stronger than
its potential counterpart. By the Gricean maxim of quantity, use of such a past potential structure
as the weaker element on the scale implicates that there were reasons not to use the stronger one
in the circumstances. In other words, if the speaker knew the event had actually taken place, they
would have used the non-modal expression (‘it was the case that p’) rather than the modal one
(‘it was possible, desirable, intended that p would happen’). As we will show in section 3.4, in
some languages these counterfactual implicatures have remained implicatures, in the sense that
they can still be cancelled, whereas in other languages have become semanticized, as a fixed part
of the interpretation of past-modal combinations.
3.3. The role of aspect
Although the combination of past and modality is the most frequent one in our sample to
signal counterfactuality, it is not the only one. In addition to the 16 languages that use a
past-modal combination, there are also 6 languages that add an aspectual marker to this
combination, and 5 languages that combine modal markers directly with aspectual markers
(perfect or perfective), without past tense. Upon closer inspection, the role of these aspectual
categories is in fact much the same as that of past tense. Past tense was important in the
implicature mechanism to make sure that the utterances were located in a ‘knowable’ domain,
and that the non-modal utterance is a statement of certainty. From this perspective, perfect and
perfective marking can play a very similar role in the implicature mechanism.
Perfect aspect generally serves to establish a relation between a particular point in time (often
expressed by one of the tense categories) and an event that took place before that point in time. As
long as perfect aspect is not combined with a future tense, therefore, its effect in terms of the
implicature mechanism is the same as that of a past-tense category: it locates a structure before
the moment of speaking, and therefore locates it in a ‘knowable’ domain. It can play this role
independently of other differences between past and perfect, which may relate to features like the
continuing relevance of the past event but otherwise do not affect ‘knowability’. Thus, for
instance, in Kashmiri and Pipil, which combine perfect marking directly with modal marking,
perfect aspect takes over the role played by past tense in the other languages: in neither language
is the perfect marker combined with a future element in counterfactual contexts, which means
that the perfect marker locates the structure before the moment of speaking. The same principle
applies even more clearly to the 5 other languages that combine perfect marking with a
modal-past combination, i.e. Basque, Dutch, Georgian, Malayalam and Supyire: in these
languages, perfect aspect locates the structure before a moment in the past (marked by the
past-tense element) rather than before the moment of speaking, thus effectively creating a
pluperfect, which can either be expressed synthetically, as in Georgian (see (15)), or analytically,
as in the four other languages.
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The role of perfective marking, found in Nootka and Slave, is at first sight less clear than that of
perfect. Perfective aspect generally indicates that an event is viewed from an outside perspective as
a completewhole rather than from an inside perspective. Although this is not intrinsically related to
tense and some languages allow a perfective–imperfective contrast in all tense categories, there is a
strong pragmatic link with past situations, in the sense that construal as a complete whole is more
natural for past structures than present ones (Comrie, 1976:71–73). In some languages, this link is a
strict one, as in Nootka where ‘‘the speaker, by choosing the perfective, includes all situation
boundaries in the assertion, and thereby asserts its completeness, [thus leaving] little room for the
situation to be interpreted as ongoing at the time of speaking’’ (Davidson, 2002:226). In this sense, a
combination of the conditional mood with perfective aspect in Nootka, as in (31), has the same
effect as a combination with past tense as far as scalarity is concerned, and also leads to a
counterfactual interpretation. The same applies to Slave, where perfective is restricted to past
structures and ‘‘marks completed actions’’ (Rice, 1989:486).
(31) wa’=’al=we’ in Kwatjat aqi-s=qu:=s naq-(y)u al NOOTKA
say=TEMP=QT Kwatyat what–do=COND=1SG see–perceive.PERFV
‘‘Kwatyat said, ‘‘How could I have seen him?’’’’ (Davidson, 2002:278)
Thus, both perfect and perfective aspect can play the same role as past tense in the derivation
of counterfactual implicatures. From the perspective of the existing literature on counter-
factuality, it is remarkable that there is no single language in the sample that uses imperfective
rather than perfect or perfective aspect in simple counterfactual constructions, in spite of the fact
that imperfective aspect has been claimed to a typical feature of counterfactuality just like past
tense (see, for instance, Fleischman, 1995).
3.4. Further evidence
In the previous two sections, we have tried to make a plausible case to show that the
counterfactual feature of polarity reversal can be analysed as originating in a Gricean quantity
implicature derived from the compositional semantics of the combinations found in the sample.
The basic argument in favour of the proposal so far is that the recurrence across languages of
specific combinations of elements to mark counterfactuality suggests that the link with
counterfactuality is not fortuitous, and must have some functional motivation. In this section, we
will discuss some additional, more specific evidence for the plausibility of the proposed analysis,
by showing how the data in the sample have two further characteristics that are typical of an
origin in pragmatically derived implicatures. On the one hand, we will show that the basic
compositional meaning of the elements in the combinations still plays a role in the interpretation
of the structures, in other words, that the feature of polarity reversal is simply an extra layer of
interpretation added to the basic compositional layer. On the other hand, wewill also show that in
some languages the feature of polarity reversal still shows traces of an origin as implicature
because of its cancellability.
If we look at the counterfactual utterances in our sample, the interpretation of these structures
is never just that something did not happen, but that it did not happen in spite of indications to the
contrary. In other words, counterfactual structures do not just reverse polarity (indeed, languages
have negation to do this job), but always combine this with another layer of meaning: (i) an event
was potential in some way, but (ii) in the end it did not occur. The latter component can of course
be identified with the feature of polarity reversal (negative if the clause is marked positively, and
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vice versa), while the former component can be identified with the modal markers of potentiality
(epistemic, dynamic or deontic) that are found in all combinations of elements that mark
counterfactuality. What this shows is that the feature of polarity reversal is not the only aspect of
meaning associated with these combinations, but that the original compositional semantics of the
combinations continues to play a role: counterfactual structures combine polarity reversal with
modal meanings of potentiality.
Specifically, if we look at the counterfactual structures in our sample in terms of modal aspects
of interpretation, we can easily classify them according to the three basic types of potentiality
described in section 3.1. First, there are counterfactual structures with a basic meaning of
epistemic modality, as in the Gooniyandi structure in (32) where the subjunctive marks the
speaker’s epistemic uncertainty about actualization. Second, there are also counterfactual
structures with a basic meaning of dynamic modality, as in the Ndyuka structure in (33) where the
future marker has a dynamic-modal feature of clause participant’s intention. Finally, there are
counterfactual structures with a basic meaning of deontic modality, as in the Korean structure in
(34), where the debitive marker (somewhat confusingly glossed with ‘if only’ in this example)
marks the speaker’s desire.
(32) yoowooloo-ngga marni-wa gard-ja-yooni GOONIYANDI
man-ERG sister-his hit-SUBJ-IRR+CL
‘‘The man might have hit his sister (though I know he didn’t)’’ (McGregor, 1990:548)
(33) da Fofi be a naki en, ma a di an lon NDYUKA
Father Fofi ANT FUT hit 3sobl but BE since 3S run
‘‘Mr Fofi was going to hit her, but given that she ran away [then he didn’t]’’
(Huttar and Huttar, 1994:495)
(34) ne-nun ecey ttena-ss-eya hay-ss-ta KOREAN
you-TC yesterday leave-PST-if only do-PST-DC
‘‘You should have left yesterday.’’ (Sohn, 1994:347)
These examples clearly show that polarity reversal is simply an extra layer of interpretation
added onto the basic compositional interpretation of potentiality and pastness.
A second argument in favour of the implicature approach is the fact that the semantic status of
the feature of polarity reversal is variable in the languages in the sample. In many languages,
polarity reversal has become part of the basic meaning of the past-modal combination, and is in
noway cancellable. This is the case, for instance, in the Gooniyandi structures discussed in (26b).
In other languages, however, the feature of polarity reversal is still cancellable, allowing variation
between the counterfactual interpretation, and the basic compositional meaning without polarity
reversal. One example of this is Dutch, where the deontic modal verb moeten in a past perfect
structure generally receives a counterfactual interpretation, as in (35), but in some cases can also
be used with a basic meaning of past deontic modality without polarity reversal. This is the case
in an example like (36), which is structurally the same as (35) but indicates that David had been
obliged to sell the car and in the end did sell it.
(35) David had de wagen moet-en verkop-en. Hij had DUTCH
David have.PST the car must-INF sell-INF he have-PST
veel geld kun-en krijg-en.
much money can-INF get-INF
‘‘David should have sold the car. He could have made a lot of money.’’
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(36) David had de wagen moet-en verkop-en. Daarom was
David have.PST the car must-INF sell-INF that’s.why be.PST
hij niet kun-en kom-en.
he not can-INF come-INF
‘‘David had been obliged to sell the car. That’s why he hadn’t been able to come.’’
Detailed discussion of such nuances is rare in the grammars we consulted, but there are partly
parallel examples that point in the same direction. In Ndyuka, for instance, the combination of
relative past marker be with relative future marker o that is typically found in the apodosis of
counterfactual conditionals, can also be used in simple clauses, in which context the
counterfactual feature seems to be variable. Apart from examples that include polarity reversal,
like (33) above, there are also examples that do not include it, like the structure in (37) where the
proposition marked with be o is known to be actualized.
(37) ne den poti mi na opalani fee me te a foto. NDYUKA
CJ 3Pl put 1S LOC airplane fly 1S until LOC city
Da meke u taki a waka bun gi me,
CJ make 1/2pl talk 3S walk good give 1S
bika a seefi dei de me be o go a foto kaba tu
because the-Sg same day there 1s ANT FUT go LOC city already too
‘‘Then they put me on an airplane and flew me to Paramaribo. In other words, it
turned out well for me, since I had already been planning to go to town that same
day anyway.’’ (Huttar and Huttar, 1994:495)
Another relevant example comes from Basque, where one of the ways to form counterfactual
apodoses (apparently not used in simple clauses) is to combine a past indicative auxiliary with a
future participle (again with modal uses), as in (38). Although the counterfactual interpretation is
the default one, the same combination can also be used without polarity reversal in complement
structures like (39), where it just expresses past intention or likelihood (from the perspective of
the agent in the past main clause) and does not include polarity reversal.
(38) Patxi etorri balitz Maddik ikusiko zuen BASQUE
Patxi come if.AUX Maddi.ERG see.FUT AUX.PST
‘‘If Patxi had come, Maddi would have seen him.’’ (Hualde and de Urbina, 2003:269)
(39) esan zidan egingo zuela BASQUE
tell AUX.PST do.FUT AUX.PST.COMP (our glosses)
‘‘S/he told me s/he would do it’’ (Hualde and de Urbina, 2003:267)
Taken together, the fact that the basic compositional meaning is always part of the
interpretation of counterfactual structures, and the fact that in some cases the feature of
polarity reversal can be cancelled, provide additional support for the analysis of this feature as
originating in an implicature based on the basic meaning of past/perfect/perfective modality.
As already mentioned, not all structures still allow interpretations without polarity reversal
(the English construction with should have in (2) is a good example), but this is not
necessarily an argument against an implicature analysis. Elements of meaning that originate
as pragmatic implicatures can easily become semanticized if they are frequent and typical
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enough, as shown by the work of Traugott and Dasher (2001) on the evolution of other types
of modal elements.
3.5. What about the other patterns?
The proposal we have outlined so far accounts for the majority of the patterns of
counterfactual marking found in the sample, but it does not cover the seven languages where
counterfactuality is marked by one single element that need not be combined with anything else
to signal counterfactuality. Does this mean that counterfactual marking has developed along a
different path in these languages, without an intervening stage of implicatures deriving from a
more basic meaning? Although this cannot be excluded, we will argue in this section that there is
some, admittedly rather tentative, evidence that points towards a link with modal markers as with
the other types of marking in the sample.
For one language that marks counterfactuality directly, there are relatively straightforward
indications of a link with modality. In Mwotlap, counterfactual structures typically contain the
‘prospective’ marker so, as is the case in (40). Apart from such counterfactual uses, however, the
same element can also be used in a deontic sense, to mark speaker’s desire as in (41), and in a
dynamic sense, to mark agent’s intention as in (42).
(40) Keˆ so ni-van Amot MWOTLAP
3SG PRSP AO-go Mota
‘‘He should have gone to Mota’’ (Franc¸ois, 2001:853; our translation)
(41) Neˆk so lep me na-tan anen MWOTLAP
2SG PRSP take VTV ART-bag DX2
‘‘You should bring me that bag there.’’ (Franc¸ois, 2001:845; our translation)
(42) Imam mino so ni-et neˆk MWOTLAP
father my PRSP AO-see 2SG
‘‘My father wants to see you.’’ (Franc¸ois, 2001:840; our translation)
The difference between the counterfactual sense in (40) and the deontic and dynamic modal
senses in (41) and (42) depends on whether the utterance is in a past or a non-past context
(Franc¸ois, 2001:851–852): the prospective particle receives a counterfactual interpretation in a
past context and a dynamic or deontic interpretation elsewhere. This pattern may seem similar to
the combinations of markers discussed in previous sections, but what distinguishes this language
is that the difference between past and other tenses is not marked in the clause: Mwotlap does not
grammaticize tense distinctions (Franc¸ois, 2001:697), and the distinction between past and other
tense domains is entirely a matter of context. In this perspective, the situation in Mwotlap can be
regarded as intermediate between direct marking and combined marking: there is only one
marker to which counterfactuality can be assigned, but like with the combinations of markers
discussed in the previous section, this marker also has modal uses in other constructions, and it is
use in a past-tense domain that serves as a trigger for counterfactual interpretations.
In this perspective, Mwotlap is probably similar to Cantonese, another language from the
sample that does not grammaticize tense distinctions. As mentioned, there is no fundamental
difference between the situation inMwotlap and the past-modal combinations described for other
languages, except for the grammatical marking of tense. The reason why Cantonesewas included
in the category of explicit past-modal combinations in section 2.2 is that the most typical
examples of counterfactuality as described in Matthews and Yip (1994:231, 235) combine modal
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verbs with adverbial elements referring to a past tense. From the information at our disposal, it is
not clear whether purely contextual past domains can have the same effect of triggering
counterfactual interpretations for the modal elements, as is the case in Mwotlap. More generally,
however, it does not seem unreasonable to suspect that the apparently ‘exceptional’
counterfactual construction in Mwotlap is actually representative of counterfactual constructions
in a wider set of languages that do not grammaticize tense distinctions, like the languages of
mainland Southeast Asia (Bisang, 1996). In such cases, the functional load of the grammatical
marking of counterfactuality may fall entirely on a modal marker that can trigger counterfactual
implicatures in past contexts, and that has pure modal uses in other contexts.
The six other languages that mark counterfactuality directly do not show any other uses apart
from the specifically counterfactual ones, but there is some indication that at least diachronically
some of them may be related to modal marking. If we look at the semantics of these dedicated
markers, for instance, their interpretation is double-layered just like that of the combinations of
markers discussed in the previous section: they do not simply indicate that something did not
occur, but they signal that (i) some event was potential and (ii) in the end did not occur. Crucially,
the potentiality involved can again be linked up with modal features, and shows a similar
variation in types of modality as found with combinations of markers. Thus, for instance, the
dedicated counterfactual suffix -et in Kolyma Yukaghir has a deontic feature, as in (43) (example
repeated from (6) above), while the dedicated suffix –hine in Hua seems to be restricted to
epistemic interpretations, as in (44).
(43) tudel pud-o-l lebie-ge modo-t KOLYMA YUKAGHIR
he upper-VR-ANR earth-LOC sit-SS:IMPF
m-et+l’e-j
AFF-IRR+be-INTR:3SG
‘‘He should have lived on the upper earth.’’ (Maslova, 2003:172)
(44) dmi-ro-ka va-sine HUA
1Sg.give-PERF-2Sg.MED go-2Sg.CTF (our gloss)
‘‘You would have given it to me and gone.’’ (Haiman, 1980:406)
While these semantic facts as such are far from conclusive as evidence for a diachronic
relation with modal markers, there are in fact some languages, both within our sample and
beyond, where there are some indications that a dedicated marker diachronically derives from a
modal markers or a combination of past and modal markers.10 In Martuthunira, for instance, the
counterfactual suffix appears to be diachronically complex, incorporating an element -ma/-nma
that is probably related to a form with an imperative function in a number of neighbouring
languages (Dench, 2000), though not formally related to the imperative suffix in Martuthunira
itself. In two of these neighbouring languages (Nyamal and Jiwarli), moreover, there are
functional equivalents of the counterfactual affix that also incorporate this same element
(Dench, 2000). While it is not certain that the ultimate reconstruction of this element at the
Pama-Nyungan level will also be an imperative, mainly because it also surfaces as an aspectual
(imperfective) form elsewhere (Dench, 2000; see also Alpher, 1990), from the perspective of this
study the systematic formal relation with elements with imperative function in these languages is
at least suggestive of a diachronic relation between dedicated counterfactual markers and modal
categories. Beyond our sample, another instance of a diachronic relation with a past-modal
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combination can be found in Rembarrnga, which has a dedicated counterfactual morpheme that
is suffixed to the finite verb (McKay, 1975), as illustrated in (45). In spite of the use of a dedicated
marker, this language is genetically related to languages that systematically mark counter-
factuality with a combination of a modal irrealis prefix and a past-tense suffix to the verb, as
Wardaman (see (8) above) or Nunggubuyu, illustrated in (46) (note that irrealis marking is fused
with pronominal prefixes, thus creating a distinction between a realis and an irrealis series of
bound pronouns).
(45) kuwa nga-tharl-m kar pulut-t REMBARRNGA
PURP 1min.S-go.hunting-PST.CTF but bullet-PRIV
‘I was going to go hunting, but I have got no bullet’ (McKay, 1975:244)
(46) yagimaga bamba:-‘=bi-ni bamba:-‘=ga:ru:-‘ NUNGGUBUYU
NEG IRR.2>3-hit-PST IRR.2>3-leave-PST
‘You should not have hit him, you should have left him.’ (Heath, 1984:345)
This suggests that the dedicated marker in Rembarrnga may derive from modal-past
combination in a prefix–suffix pattern, via (i) a specialization of tense suffixes for realis and
irrealis contexts, which results in distinct suffixes for realis past and irrealis past (something we
find in Gooniyandi, see the discussion of example (11) above), and (ii) loss of the irrealis prefix
set, of which Rembarrnga still has remnants in the form of a general subordinate prefix.
Verstraete (2005) provides further arguments for this scenario.
4. Conclusions
4.1. Summary
The basic purpose of this paper was twofold: first, to find out how counterfactuality is marked
in simple clauses across languages, and second, to discuss what these patterns of marking tell us
about the nature and origins of counterfactuality. In the empirical part of the study, we used a
broad sample of languages to determine how counterfactuality is marked in simple clauses. We
showed that in the majority of languages, counterfactuality is not signalled by ‘dedicated’
markers, but rather by combinations of markers that have other functions in other contexts,
typically a combination of a modal element marking potentiality with past tense and/or perfect or
perfective aspect. These findings go against a number of commonly accepted views in the
literature, especially concerning the role of past tense and imperfective aspect. Neither category
is universal in the combinations used to mark counterfactuality: the only element that is found in
all combinations is a modal element rather than a tense or aspect marker. The other element that is
combined with this modal element is typically past tense if it is a tense marker, but it can also be
an aspectual marker, in which case it is typically a perfect or a perfective marker rather than an
imperfective one.
On the basis of these patterns, we argued that the defining feature of polarity reversal in
counterfactual constructions typically originates as a scalar quantity implicature derived from a
combination of past and modal features. Past potential constructions are statements of
potentiality, and are therefore epistemically weaker than the corresponding past non-modal
constructions, which are statements of certainty. On the basis of the Gricean maxim of quantity,
therefore, use of the epistemically weaker past modal construction implicates that the stronger
past non-modal construction does not apply. In other words, stating that something was possible,
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desirable or intended at some moment in the past is weaker than stating that it did occur, which
means that the speaker who uses the weaker structure implicates that it did not in fact occur
(and vice versa when starting out from negative polarity). We showed that this is not just a
plausible way to account for the cross-linguistically frequent association of counterfactuality
with certain tense-aspect-modality combinations, but that there is also additional evidence for an
implicature analysis. The basic meaning of past modality still plays a role in the interpretation of
counterfactual structures, and in some languages the feature of polarity reversal can still be
cancelled in some contexts, thus leaving just the basic compositional meaning.
It will be noted that in spite of our argument against the universality of past tense in
counterfactual constructions, the feature of tense still plays a crucial role in our proposal about the
nature of counterfactuality. Indeed, even aspectual markers were shown to be relevant only insofar
as they as they have temporal implications, i.e. insofar as perfect and perfective markers are
restricted to the past domain. In spite of this similarity, however, in our proposal past tense has
exactly the opposite role it had in the traditionalmetaphoricalmodel that regards distance in time as
a metaphor for distance in reality. We argue that past tense does not lead to counterfactuality by
virtue of its closeness to non-reality, as in Fleischman’s (1989) metaphorical model, which maps
distance in reality to distance in time, but rather by virtue of its closeness to reality. In our proposal,
it is only because past tense ensures that a past non-modal construction is a statement of certainty
that it can form a scale with past modal constructions and thus trigger counterfactuality
implicatures. In this sense, our proposal about the origins of counterfactuality as an implicature can
be seen as a reversal of the traditional role assigned to tense and aspect categories in counterfactual
marking: past tense is there to ensure reality rather than irreality, and the combination of this feature
of realitywith the feature of potentiality contributed by themodal element is what creates the scalar
organization and the corresponding implicature of polarity reversal.
4.2. Implications
The analysis in this study has focused exclusively on counterfactuality in simple clauses. A
question we have not yet addressed is how the patterns of marking in simple clauses and the
proposed explanatory model relate to counterfactuality in conditional constructions like (1) above.
To round off this study, therefore, we will briefly touch upon the relation with conditional
counterfactuals, and some of the implications of our proposals for the analysis of these
constructions. As already noted in the introduction, the relation between simple and conditional
counterfactuals is not straightforward: counterfactual constructions in simple clauses are not
necessarily the same as conditional counterfactuals with an elided protasis. In a number of
languages for which we can compare counterfactual marking in the two contexts, a simple
counterfactual construction is structurally different from the apodosis of a conditional
counterfactual construction. InCantonese, for instance, a simple counterfactual uses a combination
of a modal verb and a past-tense adverb (see (7) above), while a counterfactual apodosis uses an
optional perfective marker, as shown in (47). A similar situation is found in Georgian, where a
combination of the pluperfect with a modal auxiliary marks counterfactuality in simple clauses
(see (15) above), while a counterfactual apodosis can bemarkedwith just the pluperfect, as in (48).
(47) yu`hgwo´ mo´uh ngo´h, le´ih yı´hging se´i-jo´ ho´u loih la!
if not-have me you already die-PERFV very long PRT
‘‘If it was’t for me, you would have been dead long ago!’’
(Matthews and Yip, 1994:304)
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(48) sen rom ar c’ar-g-e-kez-eb-in-e,
you(DAT) if not PREV-you-IOV-encourage-TS-PLUP-IND(1SG)
i+kn+eb(+a) ar ga-m-e-k’et-eb-in-a
perhaps not PREV-I-IOV-do-TS-PLUP-it
‘‘If you had not encouraged me, perhaps I would not have done it.’’
(Hewitt, 1995:268)
Differences like these indicate that simple counterfactuals cannot always be equated with
conditional counterfactuals with an elided protasis, and that our findings about counterfactuality
in simple clauses cannot be extrapolated to counterfactuality in conditionals in any simple way.
One approach that could be taken is to regard the conditional protasis as the equivalent of a
modalizing element for the apodosis, because the protasis states a possible world in terms of
which the apodosis is evaluated (see, for instance, Lazard, 2001:421). In this perspective, it is not
the counterfactual apodosis as such that should be compared with the simple counterfactual,
because such a comparison ignores the modalizing effect of the protasis. If we take into account
this effect by counting the presence of a protasis as a type of modal element for the apodosis, the
counterfactual conditionals in the sample show very similar patterns of marking to simple
counterfactuals (though not necessarily on a language-by-language basis): the Georgian
construction in (48) combines a modalizing protasis with a pluperfect apodosis, and the
Cantonese construction in (47) combines a modalizing protasis with a perfect apodosis.
While many languages structurally distinguish simple counterfactuals from conditional
counterfactuals with an elided protasis, there are also some instances in our samplewhere the two
are structurally identical. There may in fact be some systematicity in which types of simple
counterfactuals are structurally identical to conditionals with an elided protasis, especially if one
looks at the type of modality involved. In our analysis, we treated the three basic subtypes of
modality (epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality) in the same way, since all three types can
lead to counterfactual implicatures when combined with the right temporal or aspectual features
(see especially section 3.4). From the perspective of the relation with conditional counterfactuals,
however, there is one type that stands out: it is mainly simple counterfactuals with epistemic
modality that are structurally identical to conditionals with elided apodoses. In Hua, for instance,
the counterfactual construction, expressed by allomorphs of the dedicated marker –hine, has a
clear epistemic interpretation in simple clauses, expressing a past likelihood that did not
eventuate, glossed by ‘almost’ (see example (4) above). This construction is not limited to
genuine simple counterfactual contexts, but can also be used in the apodosis of conditional
constructions, as illustrated in (49), where both the protasis and the apodosis use allomorphs of –
hine.
(49) korihu-hipa-na via ta-sine
run.away-REL.CTF.A-thing tears shed-CTF.B
‘If I had run away, you would have cried.’ (Haiman, 1980:185)
If we look at this similarity in terms of what we suggested above about the modalizing effect of
a protasis, the dominance of epistemic modality in such cases can probably explained along
similar lines. The way a protasis modalizes an apodosis is essentially epistemic, because it
presents a possible world from whose perspective the likelihood of the apodosis is evaluated (see,
for instance, Akatsuka, 1985 on the basically epistemic nature of conditionals). From this
perspective, the difference between languages that have similar or distinct simple and
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counterfactual conditionals may be a matter of the type of modality involved in marking
counterfactuality, and of how the modal information is distributed over the protasis and
apodosis. Epistemic modality is semantically compatible with the basically epistemic
orientation of conditionals, while other types of modality are not. Semantically, therefore, it
would not be surprising if some simple counterfactual types with epistemic markers are
similar to conditional apodoses, while most other types with deontic and dynamic markers
are not. Apart from the type of modality, another factor that may turn out to be relevant is the
distribution of modal information in the construction. In some languages, the mere presence
of a protasis can be sufficient as epistemic modalization for the conditional as a whole, as is
the case in the Georgian structure in (48) above, where the apodosis does not itself contain any
modal element, epistemic or non-epistemic. In others, however, the epistemic value of the
presence of a protasis can be replicated with an additional modalizing element in the apodosis,
as in Hua.
The ‘bridging’ status of epistemic modality between simple and conditional counterfactuals
raises a final question, viz. in how far our argument about the origins of polarity reversal as an
implicature could be extended from simple counterfactuals to conditional ones. It is beyond the
scope of this study to answer this question in any detailed way, but there are at least two
indications that our analysis might be useful. First, there is evidence from the types of marking
found in conditional counterfactuals. Lazard’s (2001) study of counterfactuality in conditionals
shows a very similar distribution of marking patterns to the types we find for counterfactuality in
simple clauses: a majority pattern of combined marking (mainly tense and some kind of modal
marking), and a minority pattern of dedicated markers (Lazard, 2001:421). Secondly, there is
evidence from the semantic structure of counterfactual conditionals. It has been noted by a
number of authors working on counterfactual conditionals that the canonical forms associated
with them, like (50), can occasionally receive interpretations without polarity reversal
(see Karttunen and Peters, 1977; Comrie, 1986; Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005:72–73). The
standard interpretation of (50) is counterfactual, i.e. that the prisoners did not receive outside
help, and that the guards did not notice intruders. In addition, however, an interpretation without
polarity reversal is not excluded: (50) can also be interpreted as simply being uncertain about
polarity reversal, for instance when it is continued with the guards didn’t report anything
suspicious, but they may have been bribed.
(50) If the prisoners had received help from outside, the guards would have noticed
the intruders.
The fact that the feature of polarity reversal can be removed is remarkably similar to what we
observed for simple counterfactuals in section 3.4, where we used the occasional variability of
polarity reversal as an argument to further support our hypothesis about its origins as an
implicature. Moreover, if we look at what aspects of interpretation remain in a conditional
counterfactual once the feature of polarity reversal is removed, the similarity with simple
counterfactuals becomes evenmore pronounced. In the non-counterfactual interpretation of (50),
what remains is a meaning of past epistemic modality, describing the likelihood of the guards’
actions in the possible world introduced by the protasis. In other words, the semantic structure of
conditional counterfactuals seems to be similar to the simple counterfactuals studied here: there
are two layers of interpretation, one of past modality, which is present in all interpretations, and
another of polarity reversal, which is present in standard interpretations but can occasionally be
dropped. Such similarities in semantic structure at least give some indication that a scenario
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deriving polarity reversal by a similar type of implicature could be set up for the counterfactual
conditionals, although a detailed analysis of this hypothesis is far beyond the scope of this study.
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Appendix A. Languages used in the sample
Family Language Source Counterfactuality
Simple Conditional
Afro-Asiatic, Chadic Hdi Frajzyngier (2002)
Afro-Asiatic, Cushitic Somali Saeed (1999)
Altaic Turkish Kornfilt (1997)
Amerind, Central Pipil Campbell (1985)





























Austric, Austro-Tai, Daic Thai Noss (1964)
Austric, Austroasiatic Temiar Benjamin (1976)
Austric, Miao-Yao Hmong Njua Harriehausen (1990)
Basque (isolate) Basque Saltarelli (1988)





Chukchi-Kamchatkan Chukchi Dunn (1999)
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Appendix A (Continued )
Family Language Source Counterfactuality
Simple Conditional
Elamo-Dravidian Malayalam Asher and
Kumari (1997)
Eskimo-Aleut West Greenlandic Fortescue (1984)
Etruscan (isolate) Etruscan Rix (2004)
Gilyak (isolate) Gilyak Gruzdeva (1998)
























Kartvelian Georgian Hewitt (1995)




Korean-Japanese-Ainu Korean Sohn (1994)
Meroitic (isolate) Meroitic –

























Pidgins and Creoles Ndyuka Huttar and
Huttar (1994)





Sumerian Sumerian Michalowsky (2004)
Uralic-Yukaghir Kolyma Yukaghir Maslova (2003)
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